Judicial Independence in Spain: Constitutional Foundations, Historical Evolution, and Contemporary Challenges

Abstract

Abastract: Judicial independence is one of the essential pillars of the Rule of Law, whose origins trace back to the philosophical principles of Socrates, Locke, and Montesquieu. These thinkers argued that power must be limited by institutional mechanisms to prevent abuse, giving rise to the theory of the separation of powers as a safeguard for political freedom.

In Spain, although the 1978 Constitution enshrines judicial independence in Article 117, the 1985 legislative reform allowed the General Courts to appoint all members of the General Council of the Judiciary (CGPJ), leading to increasing politicization of the body. This situation has weakened the judiciary’s ability to act as a counterbalance to the executive and has fostered public perceptions of a lack of impartiality.

Concerns over this lack of independence have extended beyond national borders. European institutions such as the European Commission, the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), and the Venice Commission have urged Spain to reform the CGPJ’s selection system. These bodies recommend that judges elect their own representatives and that the Public Prosecutor’s Office be separated from the executive branch.

The European Parliament’s resolution of June 2025 emphasizes that an impartial and accessible justice system is a basic principle of the Rule of Law, and demands that judicial appointments be based solely on professional criteria, free from political interference. This resolution reflects growing European concern over the erosion of institutional checks and balances in Spain.

In this context, judicial independence should not be seen as a corporate privilege, but as a fundamental guarantee for citizens. Its weakening undermines democratic legitimacy and jeopardizes the effective protection of fundamental rights.